What do you guys think about using the microeconomics of cap-and-trade policy as an analogy to restrictive low-density zoning?

Low density zoning regulations effectively limit the quantity of hosing that can be supplied in a given area to an amount below the free market equilibrium. This seems analogous to a government imposing a cap-and-trade scheme on a housing market. (Cap and trade policies restrict the quantity of something supplied in a market to a certain amount set by regulators.)

This article has a good supply & demand graph for cap and trade: Econ 101: What you need to know about carbon taxes and cap-and-trade – Macleans.ca

Cap and trade schemes -when there are no actual negative externalities to control for- (housing density arguably produces more positive externalities then negative ones) create deadweight loss and surplus for producers (who in this example would be homeowners) at the expense of consumers (who in this example would be renters and homebuyers) which seems to explain -in part- why zoning boards full of homeowners would vote for these policies.

This seems similar to the way colluding producers in a cartel that attain monopoly power over a market will purposely restrict their quantity supplied to maximize profits at the expense of buyers, but generate deadweight loss in the process.

In the case of housing this seems particularly harmful because many of the homeowners that benefit from restrictive zoning are already far wealthier than the renters' and homebuyers who are damaged, meaning that the excessive share of surplus they make from a restricted housing market could seriously exacerbate wealth and income inequality.

Let me know if any of you see a problem with this analogy or if you think it's a good one. Thanks.