The proposal is to bore four tunnels through the Musandam Peninsula.
The Musandam Peninsula contains both UAE and Omani territory, and either country’s land alone is sufficient to connect the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman entirely independent of the Strait of Hormuz. While Oman may be reluctant to lease its territory for such a purpose, the UAE is a different story.
Japan still carries a substantial obligation to invest in the United States as part of its tariff-reduction commitments. That obligation is nominally framed around American soil — but if the proposition is attractive enough, that domestic constraint could well be transcended, given that U.S. operation of the facility would channel enormous profits directly to America.
Japan possesses world-class tunneling technology, machinery, and a proven track record — all three. Estimates suggest that even boring all four tunnels, with aggressive cost optimization, could be accomplished within Japan’s committed investment ceiling toward the United States.
Japan also has a well-established model called the “separation of infrastructure and operations” — where construction and management are handled by different entities. Japan digs; an American company runs it. That fits the framework precisely.
As a reference point, estimates suggest that a secure, Western-managed route between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman could handle demand of up to 400 vessels per day. As security improves, maritime insurance premiums would fall accordingly — and lower operating costs would naturally draw more vessels to the route. Regardless of what toll is ultimately charged, it is beyond dispute that this would generate an enormous annual revenue stream.
Furthermore, under the current U.S.-Japan investment framework, the United States receives 90% of profits while Japan retains the remaining 10%. Conservative estimates — 36,500 vessels per year at $300,000 per transit — put the U.S. share at approximately $10 billion annually. Under an optimistic scenario — 140,000 vessels at $500,000 per transit — the U.S. share reaches approximately $65 billion per year, flowing to America from the moment operations commence.
There is also interpretive flexibility within the existing framework: investments by third-party companies connected to U.S. suppliers through Japanese firms are reportedly included within scope. If the tunnel project can be positioned as “critical security infrastructure for the supply of goods to the United States,” and structured within a U.S.-led investment vehicle, a political negotiation to expand the framework is not beyond the realm of possibility.
So, the question to you all:
If Japan were to propose boring four tunnels through the Musandam Peninsula — would the United States incorporate this project within the existing U.S.-Japan investment commitment framework, and in doing so, extend corresponding tariff relief to Japan?
And what annual revenue figure would you estimate flows to America as a result?
What if Japan were to propose this to the United States — boring four tunnels through the Musandam Peninsula?
byu/Nouble01 inAskEconomics
Posted by Nouble01