Why Europe Can’t Allow Russia to Win

Why Europe Can’t Allow Russia to Win

“Two years ago we said we would never send tanks. 
We did. Two years ago, we said we would never  
send medium-range missiles. We did. Those who say 
‘let’s not support Ukraine’ do not make the choice  
of peace, they make the choice of defeat.”
Above all, French President Emmanuel Macron,  
said: “our objective is to make 
sure that Russia does not win.” 
As Avdiivka fell in February 2024, whispers 
of a critical turning point began to stir,  
suggesting more than just a tactical 
shift in the war in Ukraine. 
Amid Ukraine’s faltering counteroffensive and 
the dire scarcity of ammunition and weapons,  
the West faced a daunting prospect: Could Russia 
emerge victorious, reducing Ukraine to a shadow  
of itself, or worse, annexing it entirely?
Macron’s stark warnings underscored the  
gravity of the situation, hinting at the potential 
need for Western boots on the ground. For Europe,  
the implications of a Russian victory 
stretch far beyond the battlefield,  
challenging its security, its standing 
on the global stage, and its integrity. 
In this video, we’ll uncover the complex 
web of political, geopolitical, economic,  
and ideological reasons that render Russia’s 
outright victory a scenario Europe cannot afford.
But to see why a Russian victory would prove so 
threatening to Europe, we must first take a look  
at the continent’s geography and the strategic 
and political realities that it demands. 
President Macron was far less accommodating in 
response to the developments in early 2024 for  
a good reason. The previous scenario, which 
envisioned Russia holding a small portion  
of eastern Ukraine, was from a great power 
standpoint, something that the West could  
accept. Such a small territorial gain would 
go internationally unrecognized indefinitely.  
It would also do little to improve Russia’s 
geostrategic position. One of Russia’s traditional  
geopolitical goals stretching back to the time 
it threw off Mongol rule is to create a frontier  
with strong natural defenses. Unfortunately for 
Moscow, Russia’s geography makes this a difficult  
goal to achieve. In Europe, Russian territory 
comes at the widest point of the European Plain,  
a land feature starting with the Bay of Biscay 
in the west and ending with the Ural Mountains in  
the east. The further east you go, the broader 
the plain gets. The fall of the Soviet Union  
in 1991 was a geostrategic disaster for Russia, 
erasing centuries of gains. The new post-Soviet  
border was thousands of miles long, stretching 
from the Arctic in the north to the Black Sea  
in the south. This broad, open area has no 
natural fortifications, and it meant that  
Russia would be hard-pressed to defend its 
territory in the event of a conflict with NATO. 
Relating to the European Plain is Russia’s strong 
desire to create a buffer for the Volgograd Gap. 
This narrow area straddling Russian territory 
between the Black and Caspian Seas is the  
connection of the European Russian heartland to 
the Caucuses, and those two bodies of water. A  
severing of this line would cut that connection 
off. This area was a target for the German  
invasions of Russia in both of the World Wars, 
a memory that the Kremlin has not forgotten. It  
is no coincidence that Putin resorted to 
reducing the city of Grozny to rubble in  
the battle that raged there between late 1999 
and early 2000. It could not tolerate anything  
that undermined its control of this vital area.
Russia’s campaign in Ukraine so far has proven  
unsatisfactory in Moscow’s attempt to 
acquire more defensible frontiers and to  
increase the buffer to protect the Volgograd Gap.
It has only advanced a few hundred kilometers to  
the west at the cost of hundreds of thousands 
of casualties, material losses that will take  
decades to replace, and the most robust set of 
economic sanctions ever imposed on a country.  
Such a costly Russian “victory” was one that 
Western leaders would be willing to live with  
in private if not in public.
Russia’s renewed momentum  
might change things, however.
If Russia can advance at least  
to the Dnieper River, it will acquire a more 
defensible frontier, and if it can take Odessa,  
it will reduce Ukraine to a landlocked rump state.
Russia’s traditional geopolitical calculus and  
Putin’s view of the world as one of 
civilization-states suggests that  
he might not stop there, either.
The further west Russia can go,  
the narrower and more easily defensible its 
border with NATO becomes. This was the situation  
the West faced in the Cold War, when the Soviet 
Union and its Warsaw Pact satellite states had  
a reach stretching all the way into central 
Germany. The result was that the numerically  
superior communist forces could concentrate along 
a narrow border with NATO. With such strengths,  
the West’s only realistically guaranteed approach 
to containing the spread of communism into Western  
Europe was through nuclear deterrence.
The fall of the Soviet Union completely  
reversed this situation.
Russia’s goal is to get as  
much of the Cold War status quo back as it can.
Such an outcome would pose a major threat for  
European security. To make matters even worse for 
Europe, the United States no longer regards that  
continent as its primary geopolitical 
interest. The Indo-Pacific region has  
become the center of global commerce and supply 
chains, and the rise of China as an economic and  
military powerhouse has greatly disrupted the 
traditional balance of power in that region. 
Preventing China from becoming a hegemon in 
the area has become America’s primary foreign  
policy objective, even with Russia’s invasion of 
Ukraine. Geopolitical realities therefore ensure  
that America’s traditional security guarantee to 
the European Continent is not as ironclad as it  
once was, despite public pronouncements to the 
contrary. As early as the Obama administration,  
this became clear. President Obama famously 
referred to European nations as “free riders”  
in the NATO alliance and began Washington’s Pivot 
to Asia strategy. His successor, President Trump,  
was even more of a China hawk and had much harsher 
words for NATO members who fell short of spending  
2% of GDP on defense. The French President took 
this hostility as a warning that Europe would need  
to be less dependent and could no longer rely on 
the United States for its security, years before  
the invasion began. Even though President Biden 
tried to make a show of mending fences with NATO  
allies, his administration has also taken an 
Indo-Pacific-first approach to foreign policy,  
and the lack of American support for Ukraine since 
the fall of 2023 was likely one of the reasons why  
the French President made his recent comments.
In a televised interview on March 14th, Macron  
reiterated that sending Western troops to Ukraine 
is a possibility that shouldn’t be ruled out. 
But aside from geostrategic considerations, 
why would a more complete Russian  
victory threaten Europe so much?
First, the new French Prime Minister,  
Gabriel Attal, warned that a Russian victory 
would be disastrous for the purchasing power  
of French households because of the sharp 
increase in food and energy prices it would  
produce. Although imports of Russian energy have 
declined sharply since the start of the war, the  
European Union was still the second-largest buyer 
of Moscow’s exports in the first half of 2023.  
The EU remained the largest customer for Russian 
liquefied natural gas in particular as the year  
wound down. Although France is better-protected 
from such energy shocks thanks to its domestic  
nuclear energy sector which provides over 70% of 
the country’s power, the rest of Europe is not  
as secure. Germany, the Continent’s economic 
powerhouse, became more dependent on Russian  
energy in the years before the war, partly because 
it chose to shut down its nuclear power plants. 
Europe’s food security would also 
be imperiled with a Russian win. 
Together, Russia and Ukraine exported 
about 26% of the world’s total wheat in  
2021. Although the EU’s food supply would be much 
better-protected than major importers like Egypt,  
Europe nevertheless imported 14.5% of its 
vegetable and animal oils and fats from  
Ukraine in 2021, along with about 10% of its oil 
seeds and oleaginous fruits and 6% of its total  
crops. Russia and Ukraine combined accounted for 
nearly 35% of the EU’s cereal imports. Moscow  
securing further or complete control of these 
products would cause food prices in Europe to  
increase further. Europe is a continent already 
dealing with significant food inflation. As of  
February 2024 there is a 3% average in the EU, 
but this is only recently down from a 5% total.  
In France, the total over the same period 
was 3.6%. Spain had rate of almost 5.5%. 
A Russian victory would also force Europe 
to spend much more money on its security. 
After the end of the Cold War, Europe 
could afford to be much more lax on its  
defense spending and divert more money to other 
priorities. Under the sway of the Pax Americana  
at its height and with Russia’s strategic 
retreat behind poorly-defensible borders,  
Europe saw an end to the age of confrontation 
that had held in one form or another since the  
buildup to World War I. However, current 
geopolitical realities have forced Europe  
to increase its defense spending again.
In 2017, only four NATO countries were  
meeting NATO’s guideline to spend 2% of GDP on 
defense. In 2021, ten countries were meeting  
that target. It was a sign of the times.
In early 2023, Macron called the invasion  
the end of the “peace dividend” that had come 
with the fall of the Soviet Union. As result,  
even more NATO countries pledged to spend 
at least 2% on defense, including France,  
Germany, and Italy. Poland spent even more, 
to the point that it is now the largest per  
capita defense spender in NATO, with about 4% 
of the country’s GDP allocated to the military. 
A significant Russian victory in Ukraine would 
force Europe to spend even more of its GDP on  
defense. The further west Russia gets and the 
narrower its border becomes on the European Plain,  
the less it will need to spend on its own military 
and the more Europe will. Russia would have much  
more defensible frontiers to concentrate its 
forces in. In contrast, Europe would need to spend  
elevated amounts of money to maintain readiness 
in its armed forces and to fortify its much  
harder to defend frontier against a concentrated 
Russian military. The states of Eastern Europe,  
like Poland, would be under particular threat, 
and such a threat would elevate the risk of  
creating a wider war between NATO and Russia.
Although Russia would not have the vast numerical  
superiority it had in the Cold War, Europe would 
nevertheless be stuck in a much more vulnerable  
position, and the further west Russia can go in 
Ukraine, the worse that position would be. The  
additional money spent on security would mean that 
European countries would necessarily spend less on  
domestic programs, which in turn could increase 
internal political controversy – and this could  
be another way for Russia to undermine the West.
Through financial difficulty and unprecedented  
waves of migration, Europe’s traditional 
politics have become disrupted. A Russian  
victory would give Moscow further opportunity 
to sow discord through price increases and new  
rounds of military spending taking money away 
from civilian programs. Macron anticipated  
this at the end of February, when he said that 
Russia was “clearly affecting our own safety and  
security through both traditional and hybrid 
war.” The latter was a reference to Moscow’s  
gray zone operations. The West has thus far 
proven united in the face of the invasion,  
but a Russian victory would undermine this unity.
Macron also mentioned that Europe’s credibility  
was on the line. It has dedicated a 
significant amount of material, moral,  
and diplomatic support to the Ukrainians. 
Aside from the acute security considerations,  
the longer-term reason for European aid 
to Ukraine is to ensure that post-World  
War II international norms are maintained.
With the end of the Second World War and  
establishment of the United Nations, 
conceptions of international law  
changed. War was made illegal by Article 2, 
section 4 of the UN Charter, which states: 
“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the  
threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state,  
or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
As such, war is prohibited as a means of 
settling international disputes and is  
only permissible in self-defense or with the 
approval of the UN Security Council. This is  
part of the UN’s enshrinement of the notions 
of the right of every state, big or small, to  
sovereignty and territorial integrity. These are 
fundamental notions to modern international law. 
However, as we know by now, Vladimir Putin 
views these notions as ahistorical views of  
international relations imposed by the West, 
through international institutions that favor  
Western interests. The civilization-state model 
is his view of the world. At the start of his  
July 2021 essay entitled On the Historical Unity 
of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin lamented that “a  
wall” had gone up between Russia and Ukraine, 
which were “essentially the same historical  
and spiritual space.” To Putin, the presence of 
large amounts of ethnic Russians, Russian speaking  
people, and, according to him, shared cultural 
traditions, is more important than these Western  
notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
In effect, he considered the border an artificial  
separation of a shared cultural tradition.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz anticipated  
this clash between Western and Russian 
notions of international relations that  
the invasion would bring up. Three days 
after the war started, he addressed the  
German Bundestag in what came to be called his 
Zeitenwende – turning point – speech. After  
saying that the invasion was an unjustifiable 
violation of international law, he called the  
moment a “watershed era” with high stakes:
“The issue at the heart of this is whether  
power is allowed to prevail over the law. 
Whether we permit Putin to turn back the  
clock to the nineteenth century and the age of 
the great powers. Or whether we have it in us  
to keep warmongers like Putin in check.”
The German Chancellor further declared  
that Putin’s true intention was to go far beyond 
Ukraine and “redefine the status quo in Europe in  
line with his own vision,” by force if necessary. 
His quest was to create a new Russian Empire. 
In responding to the invasion with large 
amounts of military aid, Europe has committed  
to upholding the principles enshrined in the 
UN Charter. A significant Russian victory in  
Ukraine would undermine those principles 
and demonstrate that the use of force to  
acquire more territory and resources is still a 
valid method of statecraft. This is what Sholz  
meant when he warned about Putin’s attempt to turn 
the clock back to the age of the great powers. 
For centuries, the great powers of Europe and 
the rest of the world used force as a method of  
changing the international status quo, acquiring 
new territories and in the case of the more  
successful states, large empires. The principles 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity,  
beginning with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, 
earning greater recognition in the Treaty  
of Versailles in 1919, and finally evolving 
into the UN Charter, were supposed to close  
the book on those earlier notions. However, 
Putin challenged them in a way not seen since  
World War II with his invasion. A victory 
in Ukraine in the face of the Western powers  
would likely give other nations, most notably 
Russia’s strategic partner China, an incentive  
to also violate post-World War II international 
norms. Like Russia, China under Xi Jinping is  
an authoritarian power that has little regard for 
the current international status quo. Like Putin,  
Xi also believes that notions of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are ahistorical impositions  
of Western norms that have little precedent 
for a different civilization, like China. 
Despite ideological similarities and a reportedly 
good personal relationship, Xi has still been  
reluctant to provide military aid to Russia in 
the war for fear of Western sanctions. A Russian  
victory, however, would almost certainly give 
Xi and other like-minded leaders the idea that  
they need not abide by the post-World War II 
standards of international behavior, either,  
and become far more aggressive in their 
respective foreign policies. The danger to  
Taiwan and the nations China has disputes 
with in the South China Sea is obvious. 
This is the larger reason why Macron mentioned 
that Europe’s credibility is at stake. Failure  
to uphold the accepted international status 
quo on its own continent will mean it will be  
hard-pressed to champion it around the world and 
keep other powers like China in check. In an age  
where many leaders around the world believe that 
Western dominance is ending, a Russian victory  
would be a powerful psychological reinforcement.
In short, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced  
Europe to deal with issues that 
it had hoped were put to rest  
forever with the fall of the Soviet Union.
For its immediate political, geopolitical,  
and economic security, and for the longer-term 
conduct of international relations it wishes the  
world to abide by, Europe cannot permit Russia to 
come out of the war with a substantial victory.  
It is unclear if the continent will accept the 
risks the President of France sees as acceptable  
to ensure that this does not happen, however.
How else might Europe be forced to respond to  
prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine? What other 
damage might be done if such a thing were to  
occur? Will Europe continue to tolerate more 
risks and break more taboos to ensure such a  
thing does not happen? Don’t forget to let 
us know what you think in the comments.
Now go check out Why NATO Can’t Count 
on US to Stop Russian Invasion or click  
this other video instead! Also 
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🌍🚀 Amidst rising tensions, French President Macron vows to prevent a Russian victory, underscoring the shifting dynamics in Ukraine. As Avdiivka falls and Western military support intensifies, the geopolitical chessboard teeters on a tipping point. With the potential for Western boots on the ground, the stakes couldn’t be higher. Dive into the strategic consequences of this conflict and why a Russian triumph could reshape Europe’s future. #UkraineCrisis #GlobalPolitics #NuclearThreat #ukraine #russia #vladimirputin #putin #europe #europeansecurity #europeandefense #nato #france #germany #Macron #europianunion #militaryanalysis #geopolitics #worldnews
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