The Trajectory of India-Russia Ties Amid the War in Ukraine

The Trajectory of India-Russia Ties Amid the War in Ukraine

ladies and gentlemen welcome my name is Bill Taylor I’m glad to glad to welcome you here to The Institute of Peace um and in particular uh uh Ambassador sh very good to have you here Wes good to have you back and always uh this is a great opportunity here today I’m very pleased that uh we can welcome um uh delegations from uh from India um policy makers here in the United States Institute of Peace is focused on conflict and violent conflict around the world trying to prevent it or resolve it uh the Congress set us up uh 1984 to do that we mostly fail uh but but we try we try we’re trying in a lot of different places um and uh and there there’s conflict today so this is a great opportunity for us to have this conversation and uh India is playing an Ever larger role so that’s why I’m looking for to this conversation uh LED first uh by by uh West Mitchell um uh on this on this topic uh the role that India can play in particular with regard to Russia um I have focused in my my time here on Russia in particular the Russia invasion of Ukraine um we were just talking B and I was talking about the uh India’s role in in that conflict uh neutrality is one but uh recognition of the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity and those kind of principles uh uh Mr Modi has told Mr Putin uh how bad an idea it would be to use nuclear weapons so India has given some advice uh to the Russians uh and they seem to have followed that advice so that’s you know a tri tribute to the influence that uh India has in Ro there is uh there is a peace formula that the ukrainians have put forward um uh we were just talking about the one from China but but even more important than one from China is the one from Ukraine um and ukrainians have a formula that they are having conversations about love to have the uh Indian view of of this kind of Peace formula this is the direction that they would they would like to go so this is going to be a great conversation here this morning this is the public version so this will be on the record um and I’m looking forward to handing this over to uh Wes Mitchell who will moderate the conversation Ambassador welcome thank you good to see you thank you well uh thank you Bill and um my name is West Mitchell I’m a senior adviser at the center for uh Russia and Europe and it’s a real pleasure to welcome those of you who are in the room today but also those of you who are online I think we have I heard we had a pretty we have a pretty good online presence so we’ve got a lot of Spectators and that’s great and in particular I want to Echo bill in welcoming our Indian participants who came a very long way um before I go further I have to say up up up top I have a pollen induced um sinus infection so I was actually joking to Ambassador Sauron a a moment ago I could come across as sounding like Henry Kissinger but that’s probably not a good calling card to start a conversation with Indians I don’t think Kissinger is held in the same Regard in India so but if I go into a coughing fit it’s U it’s not me is a sign of disrespect but we’re really um pleased to um have a fireside chat this morning with one of India’s sharpest Observers of National Security generally and I think in particular he’s one of the most audite and articulate observers of India’s relationship with Russia Ambassador panash Saron um Ambassador Saron is um a veteran policy maker and Diplomat I was hearing a minute ago about how he actually spent some time in Washington as a junior Diplomat in the 1990s uh he served uh he has served in diplomatic roles in Russia including Ambassador uh to Russia and as High Commissioner to Bangladesh he was a deputy National Security adviser to Prime Minister Modi he is now a convenor at natat at the center for uh research on strategic and security issues in Delhi and a member of the Indian National Security advisory Council um Ambassador San welcome and thank you for joining us thank you very much W thank you very much for the invitation a great pleasure to be back in this beautiful city uh at a wonderful time of the year Poland notwithstanding uh thank you so much uh we have a um we’re covering a big Waterfront today you probably saw on the agenda there big picture geostrategic issues is the defense relationship the energy relationship so what we want to do with this um opening session is um give a kind of panoramic view and maybe a preview of some of the themes that are going to come up later in the in the day set the discussion so Ambassador Sauron um I think it could be useful for uh our audience here who may not be uh deeply familiar with Indian foreign policy in particular the uh nature of the relationship with Russia start us off if you will by just helping us understand where Russia fits on the global map for India why it’s such an important relationship for India and uh and we can take it from there maybe into some of the the the separate themes yeah thank you thank you V I mean I’m glad we are actually having this discussion uh let me begin straight away by saying that uh the India Russia relationship uh goes back a long way uh it uh traces its Origins to the postc Colonial uh period of Indian foreign policy and it has actually been one constant uh in a very very fast moving world uh it has survived many things it has uh survived uh uh the Improvement in the Indo us relationship it has survived the rise of China it has survived uh the multiple Wars that were fought in the Middle East in Afghanistan um it has actually survived even the collapse of the Soviet Union except for the decade of the ’90s which in my opinion was the only period in which the India Russia relationship kind of um got disoriented and somewhat fell off the radar both in Moscow and in Delhi so uh the one feature about the relationship has been its constancy and you know if we ask ourselves why this is so I mean is it born out of ideology is it born out of emotion uh what are the factors that have gone into this I think one of the reasons is that um you know we do not have a common border with Russia so we do not have border disputes uh unlike say with China or Pakistan um and uh the Russians have uh maintained a somewhat uh hands-off position uh with regard to India’s internal developments um Russia obviously stepped in at a time when our relationship with the west and the United States was bad uh not just the Cold War period but even subsequently and if you remember uh till almost 2005 uh we were under us sanctions and uh if I just take that particular episode of 2005 to 2008 the three years in which we negotiated the nuclear deal with the United States it’s extraordinary that the Russians were actually quite okay with it and the Americans were also quite okay with our relationship with Russia at that time but the fact is that you know extraordinarily speaking the India’s nuclear program the energy weap the the Civil nuclear program actually had Russian cooperation much more than American cooperation yet uh the Americans at that time agreed to actually do the heavy lifting for India in the uh lifting of the sanctions and mainstreaming India uh when it came to nuclear technology and lifting the sanctions knowing full well the India Russia relationship so both the Americans and the Russians actually lived with this reality uh so Russian political help on Kashmir I would say uh Russian willingness to give technology military technology at a time when India did not have any other supplier Uh Russian support in the security Council uh non-interference generally speaking in India’s Internal Affairs uh lack of any bilateral contentious border or territorial disputes uh these were I think some of the factors let’s um look back at the eve of the Russian in invasion of Ukraine I think I read India had something like 20,000 civilians in Ukraine at that moment um were you surprised by the scale or intensity did you a lot of people in the United States were no we were surprised uh we were surprised by the decision uh to go in um and uh but having said that I must also say that at least as far as the Indian establishment is concerned uh they were well aware of what was brewing in Ukraine since 2014 and I myself as uh The Ambassador in Moscow was in close touch with the European ambassadors uh and with the American Embassy and we knew that all was not well in Ukraine uh we were monitoring the Minsk Accords and the Normandy format discussions we were Outsiders uh but to the extent one could we knew so we were aware that things are not going as per plan we were also aware that the issues involved are so intractable uh that it would be very difficult uh to find a solution because if danat and lugansk were part of the Minsk Accords you know you had automatically considered that they had a local standy in any peace agreement so we were aware that something was going on we couldn’t understand the timing of the action on February 24th but we also knew that with the Democratic Administration in Washington uh that didn’t board well for the overall relationship although the Presidents had met in Geneva and 2021 so we were hopeful that things might actually uh look forward rather than backward um so in terms of the timing uh we were surprised in terms of the scale uh obviously like everyone else we had read the leaks in the media about the impending uh Invasion so uh but even till the end we were hoping that this would not happen uh but of course uh it did and uh then you know uh we of course all saw uh President Putin’s uh speeches to his people on the 22nd and 23rd and even before The Invasion uh he spoke about the two republics and so on so um and I must say that from the Indian Point of View uh this could not have come at a worst time because if you remember in February 2022 uh we were just about coming out of the mess and the abys of the covid pandemic in India and also we were in almost the thick of our conflict with China um on the border so from an Indian perspective uh this was the last thing that uh we wanted uh we were actually looking to emerg from these two crisis and uh the Modi government was uh really concentrating on domestic transformation and economic rebuilding of the country so this was a big hit I would say we’re now obviously in a multi-year war in Ukraine and I think in the United States and in many Western countries this been not just a strategic and political but an emotional reaction to the war and that has grown as we’ve seen the um barbarism act the atrocities have been committed by Russian troops um from India’s perspective um I think I read just to show you the difference in um perspective that in the early days of the War uh something that was trending in Indian social media was hash weand with Russia how if at all has the Indian uh mood or view of the situation in Ukraine changed over time is it uh do you do you see a change either politically or emotionally or does it just start to fade into the headlines or what’s the yeah so um you know India is a large country with multiple opinions multiple interest groups so it’s possible that uh and there is uh no doubt uh a popular sentiment basically in favor of Russia I mean Russia uh is not looked upon as an enemy country uh in large parts of India unlike for example uh if you were to conduct an opinion poll about how Indians look at China so there is a clear difference between the Indian perception of Russia and the Indian perception of China and I think this is something which we as Indians and Americans need to actually talk much more um when it comes to the evolution um I think uh the primary you know change today um has been to assess uh the situation on the battlefield uh in the that people are interested to know what’s actually going on uh who’s winning who’s losing uh and uh number two uh where is it all going to end um so we went through this phase in 22 and 23 uh which was dominated by India’s energy Imports and oil imports from Russia Etc and you know uh Prime Minister Modi and the Indian establishment uh actually uh went forward with this completely new initiative of uh kind of expressing the the emotions of the global South and they had the summit of the voice of the global South and so on so I think we went through um those phases too but then we also continued to maintain contacts with Moscow and uh with European countries European leaders and of course the United States so the I think the the intention in India was to to somehow dowe the Flames not contribute to uh making things worse uh to leverage your relationships and equities with uh the Russian leaders to tell them that look whatever is happening is having a serious impact on the rest of the world to sensitize them and I think to Europe and to the United States but more to Europe I think we were saying look our relationship with Russia is not going to come in the way of our relationship with Europe and in fact if you look at the history of these two years there is a definite discernable increase in the scale and the quality of our relationship with Europe and including uh the baltics the Eastern European countries uh not to speak of Old Europe uh and uh and of course with the United States so what India tried to do was to fire on all cylinders rather than get into this situation of choosing either or and that was in so far as the parties are concerned and in so far as the global let’s say the Southern Street is concerned uh India was also very much in touch uh with that section of the International Community and uh the idea was so today um it’s not expressed so openly but uh there is a feeling that perhaps India can in some way contribute to uh the lessening of tensions um and and contribute to uh finding uh an exit or or a pathway uh to peace uh we are not over ambitious we not um you know idealistic about this the difficulties are immense because I think what is at stake today is a fundamental uh issue about what kind of a security architecture um that will emerge from what is going on and um and of course I would say and that’s my last point the people were extremely concerned about the impact of this and the focus of everyone on the rise of China because China is something that dominates the Indian strategic uh mind space and for India that in a sense is really the primary strategic challenge I don’t mean that we look at China necessarily as an adversary but we need to develop uh you know policies and strategies on how to deal with China well since you’ve mentioned China um I was struck by some of the language that came out of the Chinese foreign Ministry last month on the Indian state of arunachal Pradesh and as a longtime Observer of Russia what stood out to me was how similar the feel of that language is to when the Russians talk about Ukraine the Deep historical and cultural and connection and I I wonder um I mean I’m looking at the Indian position on Ukraine I know that India has abstained from several very important un votes against Russia the US position you’re very much aware of is that the The Invasion is a violation of the United Nation Charter principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty uh do you worry that the um Indian stance on Ukraine undercuts uh the its position on its own territories Visa China do you see any any contradiction there um no so on the principles of territorial Integrity sovereignty I think India has repeated this many many times in different forums in the United Nations uh in the Indian Parliament in official statements we’ve said this uh repeatedly at every stage so I think on that our our position has been pretty forthright uh in so far as the China India and the use of the Chinese language is concerned look you know the fact is if you look at the history of India and I was looking at it before coming here from 1947 effectively India has been engaged in about six Wars uh collected between Pakistan and China and today China occupies approximately if I’m not wrong 56 to 58,000 square kilm of Indian Territory in Akin in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and the territories seeded by Pakistan to China under the 1963 so-called treaty so we have our territory under Chinese occupation uh the question therefore is uh what do we do and that’s my first point so it’s not as if what they said last year in arunachal is something new um you know it’s something which obviously we have rejected as actually having no basis but on the issue of the comparison between Russia and Ukraine and China and India I have a different view you know India is know Ukraine and China is know Russia so I think if you have to make a comparison you have to make it slightly more differently uh because in the case of china and India uh there is no third party but in the case of Russia and Ukraine there is a third party you have the NATO you have the European Union you have the United States which are in some way or the other a part and parcel of the conflict so I would say uh in my opinion and it’s personal um if you’re looking at how smaller states are used uh uh and which are neighbors of a larger States how they are being used uh to somehow create problems for the bigger State then my comparison would be slightly different uh between the Russia Ukraine conflict and what India faces in its neighborhood uh you mentioned the possibility of an Indian role at some point and ending the conflict um prime minister moodi is probably one of the few people in the world national leaders who could pick up the phone call Putin and zalinski and they’d both pick up the the phone do you see a role for India as a as a mediator or as somehow helping to bring about uh an end to the fighting at the right time yeah I think so I mean we’ve had a history in the 1950s in the Korean War um I think uh India actually in many ways if you look at our own internal problems within the country uh I think New Delhi has been has probably had the max maximum experience in peacemaking peace building conflict resolution within our own country between different states of India on the most most difficult domestic issues which look impossible to solve so at that level I think New Delhi is a natural uh kind of a peacemaker um and it has this track record but yet I don’t think India is going to rush into this uh because I think they have enough political sense uh and understanding of the the complexities uh the kind of players involved you’re talking about you know the richest countries of the world the most powerful militaries of the world uh you’re talking about the European continent so I mean there is a lot of awareness about the limits to Indian Effectiveness but we think that the relationship we have with all sides Europe the United States and Russia uh is an opportunity and um which is why I was actually personally uh very I found the that particular conversation very significant a few weeks ago when Prime Minister Modi spoke the same day to both the presidents and we had the visit of the Ukrainian foreign minister to India uh recently our national security adviser visited St Petersburg uh for a conference in in Russia I think all this is good it’s helpful I think India would be ready uh but at the right time in the right circumstances we’ve been invited for the uh Swiss Conference in June uh you know uh being arranged by the Swiss and the ukrainians uh but so there is you know awareness that we can there’s willingness but it’s not as if you’re going to rush into it I would say and also um I think U it’s it’s obviously clear that the solutions are very uh complex on how you can firstly deescalate and secondly uh find uh a solution and I think we are in New Territory out here that’s my feeling U when foreign minister CBO was in um Delhi he talked about Ukraine’s 10-point peace plan which I’m sure you’re familiar with and some of the provisions in that plan include the release of prisoners restoring Ukraine’s uh territorial Integrity withdrawing Russian soldiers guarantees for security are there any provisions from that plan that stand out to you from an Indian perspective that India could really get behind and um Champion or is it what’s the Indian view of the of the Ukrainian plan so I think India today is going to support any Prospect of peace and any solution that is put forward what I know uh I mean I’m not in the government anymore is that in the previous Summits uh in Copenhagen and Saudi Arabia and others India along with Brazil South Africa Saudi Arabia Etc I think the point that the Indians made was that if any peace process has to succeed it has to have some Russian Buy in because you know the question is uh you can actually Stitch it up uh but then how durable is that going to be and whether it’ll unravel again and uh if I may I think there is this uh worry about what happens if Ukraine is defeated or if it loses the war War my my response to that would be what happens if Russia is defeated or loses the War I think here we have a situation where uh defeat uh of both sides is going to lead to further instability and um this is a strange com uh kind of conflict where we do not where humiliation and uh and kind of defeat is not going to add to a medium long-term stability in the world obviously not in Europe so the exact components of the Ukrainian peace plan is something I’m sure our people are looking at but on the whole um if you really want uh some durability and some uh something to stick uh you also have to look at security guarantees or insurances and I think uh uh there was this recent foreign affairs article which is quite interesting about the whole Dynamics in 2022 so there are many you know balls being tossed up in the air uh and all of them can be picked up and you know located in some kind of a solution um so we’ll see I mean I think um it’s pretty much uh work in progress as far as we can make out you mentioned the KnockOn effects of the war and I think you’re right it’s in the course of the last 2 and a half 3 years a lot has changed in geopolitics as a result of uh the conflict worldwide and one of them obviously is Russia’s getting a lot closer to China and you see it in the economy sphere you see it in energy um it’s looking at the data it’s it’s almost as if Russia will become a ward of the Chinese economy in some ways uh does that how does that affect India’s strategic calculus going forward uh if you look if you’re looking ahead and you and you think of Russia playing that role in the future the way it did in say the Cold War where it would help to take a little bit of the Chinese pressure off of India at the right moment do you think it’ll be in a position to do that in the years ahead or do you think it’ll be uh so so much of a Bolton to China after the war that it’s not not so much of an independent player yeah so I think uh I mean clearly one of the subjects which is being studied intensely in India is the nature and the shape and the future of the Russia China relation ship um the way I think a lot of people in India see it is that uh to some extent the Russian pivot or the shift to China is involuntary uh they have been forced uh to seek Solace and strategic Comfort uh from China uh the question is whether we can arrest that Trend uh that’s the first thing second thing is in so far as the interplay between Russia China and India is concerned I think um clearly um we see um there is a Russian desire expressed to us uh that they do not want to put all their eggs in the Chinese basket and they want to keep India in play in the Asia or the indopacific region so there is that interested Russia um we also know for a fact that uh there are all kinds of complications between Russia and China um uh which are real uh which are somewhat being papered over right now because of short-term exigencies but uh in the medium to long term uh these exist um so and lastly you know a lot of the relationship and this interaction is also dictated by geography um if you look at the map and see where India is located uh it is a fact that uraia is um critical for India uh today India has a problem with China we have a problem with the China Pakistan relationship um people in India will be very careful uh not to uh do anything which might uh generate a third party to to this access the China Pakistan access which would be a strategic uh let’s say blunder for India so the Indian effort will continue to be to work towards keeping Russia and China and providing Russia some options uh in their foreign policy so um so far what we have seen is that uh Russia has tried to uh deal with India in a manner that is quite different from the manner in which China has dealt with India and by this I mean things like access to our leadership uh maintaining high level connections and contacts with India um you know they’re obviously doing all this deliberately to to show uh to the Chinese also then also I think the Russians are watching how uh China despite this friendship between between Russia and China is actually uh fairly successful and not really holding back in its uh dealings with Europe France Germany and others and with the United States so you have a situation where Moscow is watching how Beijing is going out of its way uh to cultivate uh Europe and the United States and these are exactly the people with whom today Russia is at War so it doesn’t speak well of a Russia China relationship where you see your best friend uh being in bed so to say with uh your primary adversaries so there are complexities there are uh but when you ask me the question what attitude or position Russia would take in the event of in India China I would say the answer to that depends it cannot be a simple answer it depends on what you mean by an India China problem I mean there are Shades and shades and degrees of problems we could have with China starting with uh minor skirmishes starting with economic and hybrid Warfare um right up to a full-fledged military conflict uh so I would Reserve you know any blanket kind of an answer to that it’s I think it’s all going to be situational we have some anecdotal evidence about the Russian positions let’s say during dlam in 2017 and in 2020 during the one period um but uh uh I would agree that from a Russian perspective um a breakdown in the India China relationship is going to be very difficult for them I think a lot of people here in the United States have and elsewhere have been surprised by the poor performance of Russian military equipment in Ukraine and of course the war and and the longer it goes on I think this will even be more the case place a a substantial drain on what the Russians can do with their weapons in international markets uh I noticed that the Russians are not one of the contenders and the competition for the Next Generation Indian uh fighter do you how do you see the defense relationship changing as a result of the war is it correct to observe that it seems seems to be getting thinner or uh do you think it it’s still in the cards as the major supplier you know uh actually it’s it’s good you’re talking about the India Russia defense relationship because it has a history history it has a present it has a future um it’s no secret that about 60 to 70% of our equipment is of Russian origin it’s also known that uh we still depend on a lot of uh technological assistance from Russia uh to service and to maintain and to upgrade uh this equipment but I would say that uh so a lot of our people have been watching the Ukraine conflict uh closely to see Russian military performance uh and I can just tell you what the Russians have told I mean me and others in private is that um so far uh the kind of Weaponry that they have used in Ukraine um is not their full military power which they obviously have developed over decades uh to fight not Ukraine but to fight a war with NATO so uh they are pretty confident of uh uh what they have in reserve and what they haven’t used yet um but having said that I would say that if you look at the trend line uh the basic shift I think took place uh after the nuclear deal between India and the United States in 2008 and maybe that could be the point in history where the shift began um uh the sanctions were lifted uh sanctions against uh sending high technology to India uh you know military Commerce opened we started the first few major Acquisitions in 2010 and the figures speak for themselves if you look at the or if you compare the volumes in terms of um uh you know dollar volumes between 2010 to 9 now um and you look at the expenditures uh which India has incurred in purchasing from the United States Visa V Russia I think the figures speak for themselves and it’s it’s not like a marginal change it’s it’s pretty significant change so the Indian defense budget is fixed uh the question is uh you know in this case it’s uh sometimes boils down to an either or kind of a situation there and so I I think the um so that’s one thing I mean the you know the diversification of India’s military Imports this has happened in parallel with a clear decision by the Modi government uh on development of an indigenous industry mhm and the question here is going to be in the medium to long term whether the United States or whichever partner whether it’s France or Israel or the United States or Russia which of them is actually going to be uh most forthcoming in helping India to develop an indigenous an credible indigenous military or a defense industry um you know people doubt the initial successes of this program which is valid I mean it’s not easy uh there have been some really difficult reforms that have taken place in India uh to move in this direction of Greater indigenization but I think it’s important that a relatively new defense partner like the United States should be aware that this is not the India of the 20 years ago where it was simply a question of you know you selling and India buying which was actually the in some ways also the Russian model uh we are entering new territory and and I think it’s important that the defense relationship has has a robust combination of um selling but also contributing to technology and I think the last few years uh some really difficult um you know decisions have been taken in this field uh by the US and so uh this is laying the foundations for uh because you know if you buy a platform today whether it’s in the Navy or the Air Force you talking of a dependency of maybe three or four decades and that’s the longevity of the dependency so it’s not easy to uh snap links uh immediately and uh and the fact is that today if India has the kind of capabilities that it has um these have been built over decades and um I would like to believe that uh capabilities today are more credible than they were Visa the Chinese say as than they were in the 60s and ’70s and so obviously there has been this you know Progressive buildup um and U and this is where we are today uh but it’s also recognized in India that today because of geopolitical developments India needs the best Technologies available in the world and it will try to Source them mhm and uh obviously we also are aware that this doesn’t come for free so uh you know in any relationship uh the most sensitive is the military relationship and that actually happens only when there is trust and confidence and I think we are in that phase I think in our relationship where we are doing all this I want to make sure I have time for a couple of questions from the audience but let let me ask you one more thing that I’m sure will come up in the course of the discussions today and that’s the political character of the competition that’s underway between the west and um uh Russia and China you’ve written that you disagree with characterizing this as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism uh help us understand why that doesn’t resonate in India you know uh look our our relationship with Russia uh is no secret it’s been there for 70 years it’s been known to the whole world uh and it has existed despite the political formations in Russia and uh it is not as if the India Russia relationship has suddenly come out of the closet it’s another thing maybe that it’s come to focus now because Ukraine but whether it was the the Communist Party of the Soviet Union whether it was um uh gorbachov or yelson or Putin uh this relationship has existed and if you look at India’s relationships with uh countries um you will find that it’s um less ideological than maybe the kind of relationships with the United States has with other countries I mean uh we’ve tried to build relationships with China we’ve tried to build relationships with uh other major Powers so I think this idea that uh India’s relationships uh I mean let’s say for example uh how we deal with Myanmar or uh how we even for example uh dealt with Pakistan or Bangladesh I mean all these countries have had Decades of military dictatorships uh so sometimes you have no choice but to deal sometimes uh you are not in a position to shape internal outcomes in other countries and that is a function of your own National Power um and that is also a function of trying to make the best of what you have so sometimes you may not have the luxury to uh base relationships on what you think um is um good for the other partner so I would say that um you know there are different uh kind of impulses which go into um uh which into into these kind of uh Partnerships um well I want to collect a couple questions from the audience uh and I’m only able to draw on questions in the room uh not from online but if there are questions I would just ask that you identify yourself and your organization and stand up and uh one of our microphone uh uh helpers can get to you so any any any questions in the room in the back um yep hi Ambassador San smir lawani from the US Institute of Peace thank you for for your remarks this morning I wanted to go back to the question of Russia and China and ask uh maybe at a point in the future when us and Indian intelligence communities assess that this has passed a point of no return that the Russia China relationship is um for all intense purposes in Alliance uh what does India do then how how do you sort of calibrate after that point and I recognize that that may not be the point now but potentially in the future yeah um look you know if it actually develops into uh a kind of an alliance uh um uh it will fundamentally alter uh India’s strategic scenario in the neighborhood I mean that is quite obvious from an Indian perspective that is in fact the worst case scenario where you go from a two-front or a a two-front threat to a three- front threat um my response to your question would be what can we do as India to prevent uh that uh from happening and uh whether we can prevent that from happening and here I would say it’s important for India and the United States and it’s important for India to be able to uh talk to the United States and to Europe uh to uh kind of sensitize them to the Grave threat this would pose to India and also uh to talk to the United States about its own strategic uh concerns and uh compulsions um in 1991 the Soviet Union Was Defeated without a single shot being fired the Soviet Union collapsed communism Was Defeated what I find a little problematic is that with every International Global crisis it’s the Chinese who are actually taking away the net benefits whether it was 2008 whether it is 2022 so I think India and the United States have a common interest actually out here to find strategies to deal with the power of the future not in a sense uh the power that was and uh I would say that you know while it is temp to look at this uh development and look at this scenario uh we should be actually exerting all our energies uh to ensure that this kind of a scenario uh does not happen and if on my conversations uh with the Russians and others uh within Russia actually uh indicate that they’re very conscious I mean if you use the term Junior partner or younger brother or and so on frankly um if you if you look at the map and you realize Russia is the largest country in the planet in terms of area and you look at the history of Russia um it’s not an inevitability I would say um but uh we will come to that bridge when we do I mean that’s all one can say but I to take it as a given or that it is inevitable I think would be in a sense um throwing in the tobble and saying look you know this is what is happening and this is where I think uh the US and India and India and Europe uh we can all actually play a part and and work together um I think you have to look in the future and and look at you know Rising Powers I mean and what threats and challenges uh that Rising power face you know uh you know has to through the rest of the world I mean um for me that is really sitting in Delhi the big big uh challenge additional questions in the audience Ashley good to see you Mass good to see you again can I follow up on the question that Samir just asked because it seems to me that us interests in Indian interests Converge on the fact that we do not want Russia to become a satellite of China but I’m not sure that the priorities between the US and India are necessarily at the same level in the sense that for the US the most important challenge right now is to strengthen Ukraine which means continuing the confrontation with Russia until there is some change from the current status quo whereas for India the challenge is to strengthen Russia in ways that allow it to peel away from China now if my assessment of this in congruity is correct how do we Square the circle yeah so so this is uh I think the big question we have to discuss between ourselves um so as I said initially uh uh look at the consequences of a Russia that’s defeated in Ukraine or is vanquished I mean do you think in your estimation that is going to serve your purposes in the longer term I mean I realize what happens if Ukraine is defeated or is humiliated I can understand that but I would also like you to think of that scenario where you have a humiliated defeated isolated secluded Russia and do you think that’s going to be good for the United States is it going to be good for the future of the Russia China relationship you know it’s one thing to have smaller countries being driven into Chinese arms but it’s another to have and you know this will happen under sufferance because the Russians are uh I mean if you know a little bit about them they’re proud they they’re extremely self-conscious about their glorious history and who they are uh so uh I’m not saying that uh so yes the question is whether a weak Russia or a weaker Russia I mean and from an Indian and an American point of view uh how do we uh you know position ourselves on that issue do we want a a strong Russia do we want a weak Russia I mean that’s a subject that is a good point for discussion I mean [Music] um you know if you have 6,000 nuclear warheads uh you know you are under uh stress um in my opinion I uh you know if you’re talking uh I mean what are the future scenarios you’re looking at for Russia I mean a breakup I mean once again after 30 years um a change in in regime in Moscow I mean what is it that is going to resolve or solve the problems uh Russia is not going anywhere it is here to stay uh the uh the question is whether we can agree among ourselves um on how to and yeah I agree with you I know what the baltics feel about Russia that’s perfectly uh understood in Delhi uh and you know it’s uh how we feel in the Indo Pacific um so there is a bit of a strategic dissonance I would grant that uh but I would say say uh if we have our eye on the bigger picture and the future fundamental challenges to how we are going to arrange the International System and the global order then we might follow different Pathways uh to actually address the same challenge um I mean you can argue for example what if uh you had uh the opposite true which is a weak China and a strong Russia I mean you know you you you know there are different solutions to that scenario um when Putin took over as president 99 and 2000 I would say till about 2008 or so um you know he was well regarded or uh accepted in the G7 in the West Western World in Europe in the United States um we had as I said the most fundamental moment of Indo us transformation precisely between 2005 to 2008 under the same president in in Moscow so uh we’ve had uh there are cases I mean there is historical evidence that we’ve actually managed to deal with uh the same Russia the same person the same Kremlin uh as we did 15 years ago [Music] um we have an issue about European security I mean uh uh the fact is that the breakup of the Soviet Union these After Effects are being faced today after 30 years I mean imagine uh 1991 not a single shot was fired but today maybe you are seeing uh the after effects and the aftermaths of that catalyic um change and U and how do you square this circle today so the question is how much of our mental space and our mind space is going into this issue and there is someone else sitting out there who’s actually watching you and me and saying this is good because in whichever way it goes it suits my purpose so if he’s seeing that you are preoccupied I’m not I’m not just saying in terms of money but in terms of everything else in terms of equities political Capital the cost you’re paying in the global South everything else you know are we making are we repeating history are we kind of making the same mistakes again in front of our eyes who was the single biggest beneficiary of the 2008 Global crisis if you map the rise of China historically speaking the cutoff Point actually is 2008 so maybe we should ask ourselves what will 2022 when history is written after 10 15 years show in terms of what it meant uh for the relative balance of power between let’s say China and the United States and the West um you know uh I would like to so I would say the discussion on Russia is interesting it’s important but the question is whether it is um fundamental to the threats and the challenges uh that we face um that’s really my submission I think I saw a question over here on the right lady on the right uh tan Madan from bkings thank you Ambassador s um I had a question that was separate but I just wanted to follow up on Samir and Ashley’s questions uh and your answers um as you said Russia is a proud independent country it’s made its own choices as well and where it is today is uh not just in terms of what the US has done Europe is done or India is done or not done for Russia but moscow’s choices as well and so what does Russia need to do at this point we’ve talked about what others need to do but what does Russia need to do to keep keep its own independence from China and prevent it from becoming that Junior partner that it doesn’t want to uh become in the situation it finds itself uh today uh the other question uh I uh I had was about the Russia India China uh Dynamics have you seen a change in how Russia and China are dealing with each other or interacting with each other but also Visa India in groupings like bricks and the Shanghai cooperation organization or has it remained fairly steady over time thank you uh thank you uh tanvi I mean I think on the on the first um you know Russia I think deep down realizes that the trajectories they took uh between the Russians and the Chinese have been so different and the record speaks for itself about who has been the most successful model uh because they both began with communist parties um so so in one case you had 1991 you had a gorbachov in this case they took a very different path so I think deep down they do realize that uh uh they have actually not succeeded in fulfilling the theoretical potential of that country I mean that country has everything that you would imagine and want for I mean they have everything that you can think of yet um their economic and technological successes have been um count outshone by the Chinese so Russia really needs to do some kind of deep introspection about what is the solution to domestic Rejuvenation to meeting the potential that they have obviously and they’ve admitted it themselves and I think the number one strategic Challenge and threat is demographic 140 million people with a stagnant population after Decades of efforts to increase is a huge risk and a threat to Russian uh internal security and U the prospects of uh economic growth I mean when we had the Soviet Union and I was there uh I think mik gorbachov understood this and you know he came in from the blue uh for me that was also a fantastic strategic surprise the rise of mik gorbachov because if you remember at that time in 198 8384 we had a succession of uh deaths of General secretaries they were all jraes they were 80y olds and then this 52y old from nowhere came and then from 85 till 1990 but after that so the promise was there that once once you you know kind of do away with the republics and you have the pure Russian Slavic Heartland then maybe that could be the like the takeoff point for economic growth technological growth that has not happened so number one I would say they have to do much better economically internally they have to reform structurally uh now the question is whether that economic reform can come without political reform or uh if you Tinker too much with the economy will that entail political reform which maybe they don’t want the current Kremlin does not want so that’s one issue second is again you know when it comes to the relationship between uh Russia or China with the West it’s interesting that the two have taken such different paths now the question is whether the Russians are watching how the Chinese have managed the west and how the Russians have managed the west or not managed the West so you would have imagined uh logically speaking that the integration between the Russian and the European economies would have far exceeded that between the Chinese and the European economies but apart from energy the rest of the integration has been very minimal so now how much of it is actually cultural and civilizational the question we to ask ourselves is are we doomed to live in a situation where Russia and the West uh there’s no meeting ground or they cannot coexist is that something I mean uh that really is because we all thought in ‘ 91 that you know finally uh the curse of the Cold War was over but I think today after 30 plus years we’re almost back to square one and so people are asking is there something inherent in this uh division uh is it something that can never be reconciled or is there no solution to it I mean how come uh uh China’s interactions uh with the West have been far more productive and helpful to China than Russia’s so whether Russia can look at all this and reinvent its approach uh to the west to Europe to the United States is one part of the story and the other part of the story is whether Europe and the United States can have a relook at Russia I mean tomorrow theoretically speaking or let’s say even yesterday you had Boris yelson 10 years Market friendly the golden period of the Russia us relationship but the question was was that an aberration it is the Putin era the the kind of default position or was the yelen period uh the default position and the Putin era is an aberration and what shape and form would OPP post Putin Russia take I mean what kind of a governance structure do you think uh Russia would have uh in the future and and whose image should Russia develop and now on the second part so all these actually get internalized when you look at Russia and China and bricks and Shanghai and their approach to India it’s quite interesting that the most the more V iferous between the two an antagonist against the West is the Russians and not the Chinese and they sit in the same room and obviously everyone is listening to every word that is being said and the tone and the tenor of the statements that is coming across and clearly you have a situation where the Chinese are allowing the Russians to went and to say the worst possible things but they’re not copying them they are staying back and so this distinction uh between how the Russ are using these organizations Vis how the Chinese are using is interesting to watch and it’s also interesting more interesting because everyone in the room knows the relative power of Russia and China and uh on the India and how they behave with India here I would say again it follows from it kind of builds up on the previous conversation the Russian attitude to India and the Chinese attitude to India let let say when it came to India’s membership of the Shanghai organization or uh the bricks we see a clear difference there is a very clear difference I mean uh had it not been for Russian support India would not have had would not have probably got membership of the Shanghai so it was clearly you know uh unsaid we don’t like to talk about it uh but you know the Chinese were batting for the pakistanis you know the Russians were kind of uh you know so there was this also uh paradoxically a bit of a kind of power play going on so um so that’s how the dynamic is I mean you can make out you can see hostility where it is coming uh and you can see at least nonhostility uh where it is coming so well this has been a fascinating conversation and I wish we had more time but we don’t um Ambassador Saron I um I’m impressed by how you’ve helped us look at the map from India’s perspective and I’m struck by the sophistication of your strategic analysis and it just underscores to me what I think will be talked about in Greater detail in some of the other panels that it’s a it is a very complex uh geopolitical moment we’re uh living through and it underscores to me the indispensability of the US India relationship and conversations like the one that we’re having here so please join me in thanking Ambassador saon for this very interesting conversation thank you uh we go from here to the private

A Conversation with Ambassador Pankaj Saran

For decades, India and Russia have enjoyed positive bilateral relations, strong arms trade and expanding diplomatic cooperation across a wide breadth of issues. However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has exposed challenges in its defense production sector and alienated Moscow from the broader international community, posing challenges to its relationship with New Delhi. And as the United States and India seek to expand their relationship across the defense, diplomatic and political spheres, New Delhi’s commitments to Moscow have become more closely scrutinized since Russia’s full-scale invasion two years ago.

Join USIP for a conversation with Pankaj Saran, India’s former deputy national security advisor and former ambassador to Russia, that will examine the strengths and challenges of the India-Russia relationship two years into Russia’s war in Ukraine and the implications for the trajectory of U.S.-India relations.

For more information about this event, and to join the live audience Q&A, please visit: https://www.usip.org/events/trajectory-india-russia-ties-amid-war-ukraine

Speakers:

0:00 Ambassador William B. Taylor, Vice President, Russia and Europe, U.S. Institute of Peace, welcome remarks

2:31 Wess Mitchell, Senior Advisor, Russia and Europe, U.S. Institute of Peace

4:30 Ambassador Pankaj Saran, Former Indian Deputy National Security Advisor

42:09 Audience Question and Answer

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The United States Institute of Peace is a national, nonpartisan, independent institute, founded by Congress and dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible, practical and essential for U.S. and global security. In conflict zones abroad, the Institute works with local partners to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict. To reduce future crises and the need for costly interventions, USIP works with governments and civil societies to build local capacities to manage conflict peacefully. The Institute pursues its mission by linking research, policy, training, analysis and direct action to support those who are working to build a more peaceful, inclusive world. Learn more about USIP: https://www.usip.org/about