How Iran, China and North Korea Fuel Russia’s War Machine?

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Addressing the US Congress in 2002, President George W. Bush warned of an “axis of evil” that threatened America and global security. Bush included three countries in the axis of evil: North Korea, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and – ruled by the ayatollahs – Iran.

20 years later, the concept of the axis of evil is back, albeit in a slightly different format. When Russian armoured columns entered Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the idea of an “axis of evil” was given a second life and returned to the political debate for good. Republican congressmen and some international policy

Experts began to talk about the emergence of a “new axis of evil” that only attacked Ukraine, but, above all challenged American hegemony and, therefore, the countries of the West. President Biden’s administration shies away from referring to the “New Axis of Evil” concept, but key Republican Party officials have been

Popularising it for months. Among others, the leader of the Republicans in the Senate, Mitch McConnell, or one of Donald Trump’s main rivals for the Republican Party’s nomination for the US presidency, Nikki Haley, have talked about the “New Axis of Evil”. The concept

Has also been picked up by the US press, including the opinionated Wall Street Journal. Members of the revived “New Axis of Evil” include China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Russia is at the centre of this puzzle, as it is the one waging war against Ukraine.

But the longer this war goes on, the more Russia’s ability to wage it depends on the economic and military aid it receives from China, Iran and North Korea. It is these countries that are driving the Russian war machine. How are Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang helping

Russia in its war against Ukraine? What do they want in return? Is the “new axis of evil” cemented by a deep community of interests, or is the cooperation primarily tactical and short-term in nature? Welcome to the Twenties Report. Axis of evil – Iran In September 2022, a drone was shot down near

Kupyansk in eastern Ukraine. When Ukrainians examined the wreckage, it turned out to be an Iranian Shahed-136. This was the first such incident, however, as more Iranian drones appeared in Ukrainian skies in the following days and weeks, it became clear that Tehran,

Which had been supporting Moscow diplomatically since the beginning of the Russian invasion, had decided to go a step further and provide Russia with military equipment. The experience of the first few months of the war in Ukraine has shown that drones are

An essential combat tool. The Ukrainians made extensive use of drones, using them for reconnaissance, coordinating artillery fire or attacking Russian positions. The Ukrainians used drones supplied by Western countries as well as modified commercial units. The Russians, on the other hand, were

Limited in their ability to respond because they did not have such a large fleet of drones. While it is true that the Russians increased spending on domestic drone production as early as 2008, shortly after the aggression against Georgia, they focused primarily on the production

Of reconnaissance drones. Moreover, Russian drone production was almost entirely dependent on imports of Western components. According to calculations by Pavel Luzin for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, in 2016-2017, for example, up to 80% of the components in Russian military drones were imported. After 24 February 2022, Russia’s unmanned

Drone programme, therefore, found itself in a challenging situation. On the one hand, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation has increased funding and begun to float plans to rapidly increase domestic drone production. On the other hand, sanctions have cut off

The Russians from Western components, leading to idle drone factories. While the Russians gradually began to circumvent some of the sanctions, replacing Western components with – inferior – substitutes from China, it took time to restore pre-2022 production capacity. Time that Russia did not have. In this situation, it turned to Iran, which

Has had an extensive unmanned aircraft programme for years, ready to help. Iranian designs may not be as technically advanced as their Western counterparts. But they make up for this with low production costs and the use of readily available components. The first aerial objects Iran supplied to Russia were the Shahed-136 attack drones.

According to official Iranian figures, they can reach speeds of up to 185 km/h, have a range of more than 2,000 km and are armed with a warhead of up to 50 kg. In addition to the Shahed-136, the Russians also received smaller Shahed-131 and Mohajer-6 reconnaissance

And attack drones from the Iranians. Soon after receiving the Shahed-136s, the Russians began using them to terrorise Ukrainian cities. Beginning in October, the Russians began shelling critical infrastructure in cities, attacking power plants and water works in an attempt to create a humanitarian disaster on the eve of the coming winter.

The Russian Shahed campaign against Ukrainian cities can be seen in two ways. On the one hand, Ukrainian anti-aircraft defences began to cope relatively quickly with the slow and low-flying Shahed-136s, and the Ukrainians now claim that they regularly shoot down some

80-90% of the Shaheds launched by the Russians. On the other hand, however, the Ukrainians are using up their own, often very expensive, air defence stockpile, which may later be in short supply to defend against more sophisticated targets – such as ballistic missiles.

Moreover, based on the Ukrainian experience, the Iranians have already developed an upgraded version of the Shahed. In November 2023, Iran publicly unveiled the Shahed-238, which, while having a shorter range, is equipped with a jet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of

Up to 500 km/h. The upgraded Shahed is faster and can fly at a higher altitude, making it harder to shoot down than the basic Shahed-136 version. The new Shahed also has improved guidance systems. It is not yet known whether Russia will receive

The Shahed-238, but such a scenario seems likely. A month after Iran unveiled the new Shahed, Russian media reported that the country’s factories will produce their own Shahed modernization, equipped with jet engines. Perhaps this “Russian modification” is actually the Shahed-238, whose prototype the Iranians handed over to Moscow.

For the time being, the Russians are focusing primarily on perfecting the tactical use of Shahed-136s. While they initially used them as a stand-alone means of attack, they soon found that this was counter-productive. Today, Shahed-136s are mainly used to overload Ukrainian

Air defenses. They thus provide a kind of “smoke screen” for Russian missiles launched by aircraft. Thus, the Shahed-136s, despite all their imperfections, have proven to be a valuable acquisition for the Russian war machine. It is not known exactly how many Shaheds the Iranians handed over to the Russians. It is likely, however, that

The numbers were not that huge. Speaking to reporters, John Kirby, a spokesman for the U.S. National Security Council, revealed that Iran delivered more than 400 drones to the Russians between August 2022 and May 2023. This is less than previously estimated, as

Ukrainian intelligence said there were more than a thousand machines. Yet, the data provided by Kirby seems very likely. Iran, which has been under sanctions for years, has limited production capacity and is unable to maintain a wartime pace of deliveries to

Russia. It’s also not surprising that back in the fall of 2022, Ukrainian intelligence reported that Moscow wanted to open a Shahed production line on Russian territory. A few months later, satellite images and intercepted correspondence between Moscow and Tehran confirmed

These reports. The Russians have begun expanding the Alabuga plant in the Republic of Tatarstan. The disclosed documents indicate that the Russians want to produce more than 6,000 Shaheds at this factory by August 2025. But while Iranian drone deliveries to Russia

Have attracted the most media attention, they are not the only military aid Putin has received from the ayatollahs. In April 2023 the Wall Street Journal revealed that ships loaded with munitions were regularly sailing between Iranian and Russian ports on the Caspian Sea.

In six months alone, the Iranians were expected to supply the Russian war machine with 300,000 artillery shells and 1 million pieces of other ammunition via this route. Talks are also taking place on the supply of ballistic missiles. This was one of the

Main topics of discussion during Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Tehran in September. The Russians are said to have indicated that they are particularly interested in short-range Fateh-110 missiles, which the Iranians used, among other things, to bombard the US al-Assad

Base in Iraq in 2020. Iranian Defence Minister General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, hosting Sergei Shoygu, openly stated that Iran was ready to cooperate with Russia in this regard, but that it was necessary to wait for the expiration of the ban on ballistic missile exports imposed on Iran under UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

The resolution finally expired on 18 October 2023. However, it coincided with another war between Hamas and Israel and a general increase in tensions in the Middle East. Pro-Iranian militias from Lebanon to Yemen began attacking US and Israeli targets, and the Pentagon deployed

Two aircraft carriers to the region. The threat of confrontation between Iran and America appears to have led to the suspension of talks between Moscow and Tehran on ballistic missile supplies. So, while distracting world attention from the war in Ukraine is to the Kremlin’s

Advantage, Israel’s war with Hamas is also having negative consequences for the Russians. Nevertheless, the Russians are sure to return to the issue. Analysing Iranian aid to the Russian war machine raises a fundamental question: what does Tehran get in return? Among other things, the Iranians are counting

On Russian help to modernise their air force and air defences. Iran’s air force is anachronistic, based on old Soviet and US aircraft. Many of them, such as the F-14 and F-5 fighters, are relics of the Shah’s reign. That’s why the Iranians are interested in buying modern

Russian Su-35 fighters. At the end of 2022, Iranian media officially reported that a contract had been signed with Moscow for the delivery of these aircraft. So far, the Iranians have not received any of the promised Su-35s. In September, however, Iran received its first

Delivery of Yak-130 trainer aircraft, which could indicate that talks on the Su-35 are moving forward. There is also ongoing speculation about Iran’s acquisition of Russian S-400 systems, but no details are available. Potential deliveries of Russian military equipment attract the most media attention. But we should

Also take a closer look at the growing economic cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. There is much to suggest that the Iranians’ support for Russia’s war machine was motivated by economic, rather than strictly military, considerations. US sanctions have made Iran desperate for

Trade partners and foreign investors. Although Moscow and Tehran have had close relations for years, the Russians were reluctant to invest heavily in Iran for fear that Russian companies would also be subject to US sanctions. However, everything changed after 24 February

2022, when Russia also came under the yoke of sanctions. As Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute put it, “Russia and Iran became the two most sanctioned countries in the world”. As a result, Moscow has lost any inhibitions that prevented it from increasing economic

Cooperation with Iran before 2022. The value of trade between Russia and Iran was around $4.9 billion in 2022, an increase of around 20% compared to 2021. In 2023, the exchange continued to flourish, with preliminary data suggesting that the value of annual trade

Has already exceeded $6 billion. However, the actual volume of trade could be much higher. This is because the Iranians do not include contracts for the sale of military equipment in their official statistics. Institutional ties are also developing. As recently as January 2023, Iran and Russia merged their banking systems, bypassing the

SWIFT system from which both countries were disconnected. Moreover, more than 80% of trade between Russia and Iran is now conducted in national currencies: the ruble and the rial. With Moscow’s support, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the summer of

2023, and a free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union was signed in December 2023. However, the Iranians’ greatest economic success seems to have been convincing the Russians to prioritise the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). We have already devoted an episode to this topic.

The North-South Corridor is a multimodal trade route linking Russia with Iran and on to India and the Indian Ocean. In 2002, Russia, Iran, and India signed a special agreement to build the corridor, but work was relatively slow. It wasn’t until the Russians were cut off

From Western markets and had to find alternative trading partners that Moscow became newly interested in the Corridor to India concept. Anyone interested in more details is referred to the aforementioned video report. Overall, the transport of Russian goods to Asia via the North-South Corridor is estimated

To have increased by as much as 120% in the first seven months of 2022. Russian and Iranian ports on the Caspian Sea are bustling with activity, and the scale of trade is so large that they have simply run out of ships to transport the goods. That’s why the Russians

Have begun building new container ships to handle the growing trade. For the time being, work on 4 new container ships has started at shipyards, but Russian plans call for a total of as many as 21 ships. Iran has benefited enormously from the Russian-Ukrainian

War. In exchange for military aid, it received large economic benefits that strengthened Tehran. These benefits will further increase in the years to come, with further expansion of the North-South Corridor, for which Moscow has already secured adequate funding. Iran, however, is not the only country fuelling Russia’s war machine. North Korea is also

Coming to Moscow’s aid. Comrade Kim – ammunition for food and technology On 10 September 2023, Comrade Kim Jong Un boarded a special armoured train that took him to Russia for a meeting with Vladimir Putin. This was the North Korean dictator’s

First visit to Russia since 2019. The meeting took place at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Russian Far East. During the talks, Kim Jong Un offered Putin “full and unconditional support” for what he called the “sacred struggle” against imperialism and the West.

This statement took a practical turn a month later, when the Americans revealed that North Korea had begun shipping military equipment to Russia. US intelligence had been warning of such a prospect for months. The warnings intensified in the summer of 2023, when it became clear that the war in Ukraine had turned into a

Material war, with both sides running out of artillery ammunition. The Western media mainly described the Ukrainian army’s “ammunition famine”. But Russia also had a huge problem in this respect. According to estimates by Marcin Piotrowski of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the Russians used 12-14 million artillery shells and rockets

In the first year of the war. Russia’s production capacity – already on a war footing – is large, at around 4-5 million shells. But this is still too little to sustain the current intensity of shelling. The situation is similar for ballistic and

Cruise missiles, which are also being deployed faster than the industry can replenish its stocks. As a result, the Russians have gradually begun to dig deeper into their reserves, pulling older and increasingly unreliable ammunition out of storage. The Russians quickly realised that just as they had to turn to the Iranians

For drones, they would have to turn to Communist Korea for artillery shells. North Korea is an ideal partner for supplying the Russian war machine. This is because the Koreans produce both 122mm, 130mm and 152mm caliber ammunition, on which Soviet artillery

Systems are based. Moreover, North Korea has more than 2,000 T-62 tanks, which the Russians are increasingly pulling out of reserves and sending to Ukraine. The North Koreans still have open production lines for these tanks and are able to provide the spare parts needed

To repair them. North Korea also has an extensive arsenal of ballistic missiles. Korean designs are based mainly on the Soviet Toczka and Russian Iskanders, which is another significant advantage. In October, the Americans announced that North Korea had delivered the first thousand containers of military equipment to Russia. Transport

Is by rail and sea. The North Korean port of Rason is likely to be the main logistical hub. It is not known what exactly is being shipped from Korea to Russia. However, the South Korean press, citing intelligence sources, claims that Moscow has already received one million artillery shells and large quantities of bullets.

On 4 January, John Kirby, a spokesman for the US National Security Council, revealed that North Korea had already begun to deliver its first launchers and ballistic missiles to Russia. According to the Americans, before the end of the year, on 30 December, the Russians

Launched the first North Korean ballistic missile towards Ukraine. In the days that followed, the Americans recorded further attacks by these missiles. Photos of the impact sites released by the Ukrainians show that the Russians received KN-23 (Hwasong-11Ga) missiles. This is a relatively new design, unveiled by the Koreans in 2018.

The model for its development was the Russian Iskander. The range of the KN-23 is about 600-700 km, and the warhead weighs about 500 kg. The great unknown, however, remains the quality of North Korean ammunition. The case of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 is often cited in discussions of the issue, when

Only half of the 170 122mm rockets fired by the North reached the island, and ¼ of those failed to detonate. However, the story of the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island is only anecdotal. Over the past 14 years, the North most probably has improved the quality of

Its munitions. Michael Kofman of the Carnegie Endowment commented on the debate about the quality of North Korean ammunition: “When it comes to ammunition, quantity is a quality in itself (…) Weaker quality does not immediately mean that 100% of the ammunition will not work”. Meanwhile, the North is preparing further

Equipment shipments to Russia. South Korean intelligence reports that the North’s factories are working flat out, and the authorities have even enlisted civilian factories contracted to mass-produce ammunition boxes in the military effort against Russia. The North Korean authorities are making supplies to Russia an absolute priority. As recently

As August 2023, months before Korea began supplying the Russian war machine, Kim Jong Un personally visited several key arms factories and ordered increased food rations for their workers. The Southern press speculates that the supply of military equipment may be only part of the deal between Putin and Kim Jong Un. Among

Other things, it could include the supply of thousands of North Korean workers to work in Russian defence plants. We don’t know exactly what Putin promised the North Koreans in return for military assistance. But it is very likely that it was Russian

Help that, after two failed attempts, enabled the North Koreans to finally launch a satellite into space in November 2023, after two failed attempts. In return for arms supplies, the Russians help the Koreans financially, provide food and increased energy cooperation. The Americans estimate that Kim Jong Un’s regime could receive

Advanced weaponry from the Russians, including armoured vehicles, fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles. The Koreans also want a transfer of military technology, particularly in the production of ballistic missiles. Putin’s deal with Kim Jong Un appears to be mutually beneficial. The Russians want to turn North Korea into a factory for cheap,

Mass-produced weapons to fuel the Russian war machine. North Korea, on the other hand, has no exorbitant demands and is mainly counting on economic and technological assistance, which is more than acceptable to Russia. Interestingly, despite the thousands of kilometres

That separate the Korean peninsula from Ukraine, the war in Europe is something of a proxy war for Koreans on both sides of the 38th parallel, which marks the border between the two Koreas. Indeed, the South is a very important centre of military support for Kyiv. In early

December, the Washington Post reported that in 2023, South Korea supplied the Ukrainians with more 155mm artillery shells than all European countries combined. But the war in Ukraine and Moscow’s troubles have forced the Russians to work more closely not only with their Korean comrades in Pyongyang, but also with their Chinese comrades in Beijing.

Xi Jinping advises: build it yourself On 4 February 2022, President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping met in Beijing, just before the start of the Winter Olympics. During the talks, the two leaders described Russian-Chinese cooperation as “without limits” and “without

Forbidden areas of cooperation”. More interesting, however, is what exactly Putin and Xi discussed behind closed doors. Some claim that Putin informed Xi of the imminent invasion of Ukraine. Others claim that Moscow never discussed its war plans with Beijing. We probably won’t

Know the truth for a long time. But the fact remains that the Putin-Xi meeting in February 2022 still raises many questions. So does China’s whole attitude to the war in Ukraine. On the one hand, China has not condemned Russian aggression – even refusing to call the events

In Ukraine a “war”. On the other hand, since the beginning of the fighting, China has emphasised Ukraine’s right to sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Chinese diplomats have even presented a draft peace agreement. China’s policy towards the war in Ukraine

Thus appears to be highly ambivalent. But this is a deliberate effort on Beijing’s part. This ambivalence is intended as a diplomatic smokescreen, concealing strong support for Russia – albeit less than the Russians themselves would expect. Chinese support for Russia – unlike in the case of Iran or North Korea – does not have

Such a clear military component. Chinese ammunition, tanks or missiles are not flowing to Russia in large quantities. But Beijing is giving Russia something else, something much more valuable – an “economic lifeline”. In 2022, Sino-Russian trade was worth about

$190 billion, an increase of about 30% over 2021. At the same time, Chinese exports to Russia increased by 13% to $76 billion and Russian exports to China by as much as 43% to $114 billion. Trade continued to grow in 2023. Data for

The full year are not yet available, but in the January-November period, the value of trade between Russia and China crossed the symbolic $200 billion mark to reach $218 billion. Energy commodities were mainly responsible for the surge in Russian exports to China

In the first year of the war. Finding markets for Russian energy commodities is crucial. After all, they account for about 50% of Russian exports. Before the war, it was European countries that were the biggest importers of Russian oil. The Russians sold

About 50% of their oil and 75% of their gas to Europe. That’s why, after the outbreak of the war, the West imposed an embargo on Russian oil and partly on gas, as well as a price cap. That is why it became so important for the Russians to find alternative markets

For their energy resources. Three countries came to Russia’s aid: China, Turkey and India. Of the three, Beijing is of course the most important buyer. In 2022 China increased its imports of Russian gas by around 50%, oil by 10% and coal by 20%.

As a result, China’s share of Russian energy exports has doubled from 15% to 30%, according to estimates by the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies. The problem, however, is transport constraints. While it is relatively easy to divert oil

To other markets, Greek shipping magnates come to the rescue. Gas is not so easy. Adequate infrastructure is crucial. China and Russia are currently linked by only one gas pipeline. It is the Power of Siberia, which started operating in 2019. In 2022, the Russians supplied

Around 15 bcm of gas to China via this route. Eventually, in 2024, the Power of Siberia is expected to reach the capacity to transport 38 bcm of gas. Although an agreement was signed in 2022 for the construction of the so-called Far Eastern

Route, which is expected to increase the capacity of the Power of Siberia by another 10 bcm of gas, this is still too little to be a viable alternative to Russian gas supplies to Europe. That’s why the Russians are begging Beijing to sign an agreement to build the second link

Of the Power of Siberia, which would allow another 50 bcm of gas to be delivered to China. The proposed pipeline would start on the Yamal peninsula and run through Mongolia to China. The Russians claim that deliveries through this pipeline could begin as early as 2030.

So, in total, in 2030 t he Russians could supply China with almost 100 bcm of gas. That’s a huge amount, but it still wouldn’t be a complete alternative to supplies to Europe. In the record year of 2018, Russia supplied more than 200 bcm of gas to Europe. A year

Before the war in 2021, it was 155 bcm of gas – still 50% more than the Russians plan to send to China, and only if all the plans come into existence. Moscow’s problem is also the attitude of the Chinese themselves, who have been dragging

Out negotiations on the Power of Siberia-2 for months, probably in an attempt to get better terms, especially on price. Backed against the wall, the Russians have few arguments to defend themselves against Chinese blackmail. Chinese economic aid is not limited to the purchase of Russian energy resources. The statistics tell a very interesting story.

After the aggression on Ukraine, the Russians were cut off from Western electronics. Here too, China came to the rescue. Chinese exports of semiconductors to Russia jumped by as much as 150% in 2022. This is a significant increase, even though the Russians complain about the

Quality of Chinese substitutes. In addition, Beijing periodically imposes restrictions on exports to Russia. For example, between December 2022 and October 2023 Beijing has banned exports of Loongson processors to Russia, as well as to other countries. An analysis of Chinese construction machinery sales to Russia, which, as the Atlantic Council

Notes, peaked in the autumn and winter of 2022, also leads to interesting conclusions. This coincided with intensive Russian-led construction of fortifications in Zaporizhia. In September 2022 alone, Russians imported 1,918 excavators from China, and for the whole of 2022, Russians imported almost 10,000 excavators from China, a 300% increase compared to 2021.

It was these Chinese machines that were used to build the Surovikin line in Zaporizhia, which the Ukrainians tried to storm a few months later. Rhetorically, Beijing supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but in practice, it was the Chinese machines that prevented it from being achieved. The Chinese are also helping the Russians

With their cars. Statistics show that in the first months of 2023 Russians imported 464,000 cars from China, an increase of more than 250% compared to 2022. There was also a significant increase in imports of Chinese trucks, most likely destined for the Russian military.

The case with Chinese bearings exports is also noteworthy. It shows well that official statistics may not be authoritative and that the true extent of Chinese economic aid to Russia may be much greater. In 2022, Chinese bearing exports to Russia increased by 345%.

But, this is likely to be only part of a larger picture. At the same time, Chinese bearing exports to Central Asian countries have also increased, and to absurd proportions; Kyrgyzstan, for example, has seen a 2500% increase in Chinese bearing imports. It is clear that

Kyrgyzstan was just a stopgap to hide the real destination of the Chinese goods, which were actually destined for Russia. It is worth mentioning here that Central Asia is an important element in Russia’s game against sanctions. This is because Moscow engages in so-called parallel imports, i.e. bringing goods onto its market without the consent

Of their producers. Central Asian middlemen play a key role in this process, as they have increased their imports of Western goods en masse – only to later sell these goods to Russia as “parallel imports” and make money as the middlemen. This shows how important

It is – in terms of the effectiveness of sanctions – that as many countries as possible respect them. The Chinese are also actively helping to circumvent the sanctions imposed on Russia’s financial sector. In response to Russia’s cut-off from the SWIFT system, Russian and Chinese banks have turned to domestic payment systems. Russian

Banks are connected to China’s CIPS system, while Chinese banks are connected to Russia’s SPFS. In July 2023, the US Director of National Intelligence published a report on the support provided by the People’s Republic of China to the Russian war machine. It shows that

China also provides strictly military aid to Russia, but the amount is very limited. The report includes information on Chinese spare parts for fighter jets, navigation equipment and equipment for jamming the enemy. However, China has not chosen to provide the Russians with weapons per se, i.e. weapons that the Americans classify as ‘lethal’.

When analysing the assistance Russia receives from China, we need to look at the whole picture. Unlike Iran or North Korea, Beijing has not opted to supply Russia with large quantities of military equipment. But this does not mean that China has not taken a position on the

War in Ukraine. It has, and it is clearly a pro-Russian position. Chinese aid to embattled Russia has primarily an economic dimension. The Chinese buy Russian energy resources, supply Moscow with semiconductors , trucks, construction machinery, spare parts or tools and equipment needed for factory work. From Moscow’s point of view, Chinese aid is

Huge, but still less than the Kremlin would like. Of course, the Russians would like Chinese aid to have not only an economic dimension, but also to include shipments of Chinese ammunition, artillery, combat vehicles or tanks. For the moment, however, such supplies appear to be

Ruled out. This is due to China’s broader policy towards the war in Ukraine. Beijing is trying to maintain the appearance of neutrality on the issue, with some success. Many Western politicians still believe that Beijing can play a key role in ending the war and forcing

Moscow to abandon its imperial ambitions. Beginning arms deliveries to Russia would therefore undo years of work by Chinese diplomats. It would also expose China itself to severe Western sanctions. Moreover, Beijing seems to regard Russia’s current situation in Ukraine as relatively ‘stable’, and therefore does not see the supply of Chinese arms to Russia

As essential to Moscow’s victory. To complete the picture of Chinese involvement in the war in Ukraine, another important aspect should be mentioned. Chinese economic aid to Russia comes at a price, a very high one. Over the past two years, so a very short period

Of time, Moscow has rapidly increased its economic dependence on Beijing. Today, China already accounts for almost a quarter of Russia’s foreign trade. Moreover, the share of Russian-Chinese trade denominated in domestic currencies is steadily increasing. The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Mishustin, announced in December that more than 90% of

Trade with China is already settled in yuan or ruble. This is leading to a scenario in which a war in Ukraine will lead to Beijing’s complete vassalisation of Russia. French President Emmanuel Macron himself described Russia as a vassal state of China in May 2023. However, others, such as Asia Society expert Philipp

Ivanov, point out that it is still premature to call Russia a vassal of China. The return of the Axis of Evil? So – are Russia, China, Iran and North Korea in fact the “New Axis of Evil”? In fact, these countries share many common interests, the

Dominant one being opposition to American hegemony and the attempt to replace it with a multipolar world. All of these countries look at the war in Ukraine not necessarily as a conflict between two countries, but as a clash between two

Competing orders – a clash between the idea of a unipolar world, subject to American domination, and a multipolar one. Therefore, in addition to their opportunistic interests, they are interested in supporting Russia in this rivalry, especially since this one is being waged by

The Kremlin’s efforts, not their own. Nevertheless, there is no shortage of animosity in the emerging “multipolar bloc”. Iran remains suspicious of Russia’s long-term military presence in Syria, which undermines Tehran’s influence there. The Iranians also resent Moscow’s growing contacts with Arab countries across the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi

Arabia. China, on the other hand, is wary of the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea, which could undermine China’s hitherto privileged position with Pyongyang. For the time being, however, the convergence of interests is significant enough, and the shared ideology sufficiently entrenched, for military assistance from Iran and North Korea

To flow in a broad stream to Russia. Although it is primarily economic aid from China that is keeping the Kremlin afloat and allowing the Russians to pursue the plan they devised after the defeat of the first phase of the war – i.e. the plan for a protracted war,

Which assumes that Western politicians and societies will at some point become so fed up of the war in Ukraine that support for Kyiv will end or be reduced to such an extent that Russia will be able to realise its imperial ambitions.

This is not an ideal scenario – after all, it is an image humiliation that dispels the myth of a great, self-sufficient Russia and to some extent weakens Moscow as an independent power centre. Today, it is the Russians who are being used as puppets, breaking the Kremlin’s

Self-image as puppet master. This in itself explains Moscow’s declining importance. But, when the entire structure of the state and the mafia elites that rule it are at stake, these are not decisive factors for the Kremlin. A protracted war is a major problem for Kyiv,

Whose allies operate on very different principles from Moscow’s autocratic friends. As equipment from Iran and North Korea pours into Russian warehouses, the US Congress still hasn’t approved a new aid package for Ukraine. This is because Republicans have made the approval conditional on a change in the rules for protecting the southern US border.

As a result, the Ukrainians are suffering from a growing ammunition shortage, which translates to the front line, where the Russians are on the initiative. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, are building fortifications and considering a general mobilisation. The culprits of such a situation are obviously not only the Americans but also the Europeans.

In March 2023 The European Union has pledged to supply Ukraine with 1 million artillery shells over the next 12 months. The deadline is approaching and the EU has only sent 300,000 projectiles to the Ukrainians. The fact is that, in addition to the military

Clash, there is a clash of systems. The first – based on democracy, the Western system, which the Ukrainians are trying to join through war. The second – an autocratic, vertical system of power. Centuries of historical processes have favourably

Pointed to the Western model – it was there that the vast majority of resources of all kinds – capital, scientific or military – were accumulated. However, in short periods of time, in moments of rapid change, the autocratic model has natural advantages. These include – top-down imposition of policy and immediate implementation, for example,

In the context of munitions production and exports to Russia. Furthermore- ignoring public opinion and using the media it owns to control society according to predetermined policies. An autocratic system also has the ability to effectively interfere in the processes that control democratic systems. This is done through the infiltration of Western media

And the dissemination of information, often false, aimed at influencing the consciousness of democratic societies and redirecting their attitudes towards favourable self-interest. A clear example of this is undermining the agenda of support for Ukraine and presenting it as a phenomenon unfavourable to country X or Y, using anecdotal examples and failing

To outline the far-reaching implications, second order or even third one, of abandoning Ukraine. This weakness of democracy can be mitigated, among other things, by bold decisions of its leaders. Will we see them in 2024? The question remains open.